Introduction
Choosing the exchange rate regime for an open economy is one of the classic macroeconomic problems. The conventional idea behind an exchange rate peg is that it will anchor in ‡ation expectations and increase trade through lower uncertainty and smaller adjustment costs. It may also encourage investment into long-term projects due to lower exchange rate risk/ transaction costs and therefore has a positive economic impact (see e.g. Cote (1994) and Prasad, Rogo¤, Wei, and Kose (2003) for the potential bene…ts of …xed exchange rate regimes). However, being prone to speculative attacks hard pegs became less popular, especially after the Asian crisis of 1997. On the other hand recent evidence suggests that monetary authorities in many developing countries still see targeting the nominal exchange as a priority, despite that they o¢cially claim to have ‡oating regimes. Despite a relatively tranquil post-1997 decade in most developing and emerging countries, the exchange rate volatility under these 'soft pegs' varied over time. There is also a number of studies that document di¢culties in explaining sudden changes in 'regimes' between periods of high and low volatilities. 3 Theoretical explanations for these di¤erent regimes include non-rational behaviour, non-linear decisions or heterogeneity of agents like 1 See e.g Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) . 2 See Rahmatsyah, Rajaguru, and Siregar (2002) for Thailand, Dogolnar (2002) for Turkey, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan, and Arize, Osang, and Slottje (2000) for 13 developing countries. Furthermore, evidence by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) suggests that partial exchange rate targeting is still the predominant monetary policy regime in many developing countries.
3 See e.g. Engel and Hamilton (1990) , Clarida et al. (2003) or Chen (2006) who apply Markov-switching models to explain these changes. These models have also been employed to describe exchange rate behaviour in ‡oating regimes. However, their success is still a matter of debate see e.g. again Clarida et al. (2003) and Engel, Mark, and West (2007) . the presence of 'noise traders' (see Jeanne and Rose (2002) for an important example).
In this paper we o¤er a di¤erent theoretical approach which can contribute to the explanation of these empirical observations. Using a simple small open economy model in the spirit of Galí and Monacelli (2005) but with incomplete …nancial markets we demonstrate that the way monetary policy is conducted might be responsible for the existence of time periods with large di¤erence in the volatility of all macroeconomic variables, including the exchange rate.
Speci…cally, we demonstrate that discretionary monetary policy may result in multiple equilibria, consistent with di¤erent sets of beliefs of the private sector and the policymaker.
A discretionary policy maker takes current and future economic conditions into account, but can only commit to current behavior. The current economic condition is a¤ected by the past behaviour of the rational private sector which is again based on a forecast of future economic conditions and future policy. As a consequence multiple equilibria may arise: A policy maker responds to a state that is at least partly determined by forecasts of his behaviour. Di¤erent sets of beliefs about the future policy generate di¤erent future courses for a policy maker to follow. Therefore, if the economy is hit by a shock, it can follow one of several adjustment paths, where the volatility along these paths is di¤erent, resulting in di¤erent welfare outcomes. 4 Once multiplicity of discretionary equilibria is a reality, coordination on the best equilibrium may be di¢cult. Discretionary policy is sequential: each period a new policymaker arrives into o¢ce, observes the current state and makes prediction -which are consistent with those of the private sector under the RE assumption -about the policy of all future policymakers. The policy is time-consistent by construction, so if the current policymaker perceives a particular -even inferior -policy of future policymakers, it will be optimal for the policymaker to implement the same policy in the current period. A unilateral deviation of the current policymaker from the perceived policy plan is not bene…cial to this policymaker, and the resulting discretionary policy is a Nash equilibrium in the game of consequent policymakers, see e.g. (Oudiz and Sachs, 1985; Dennis and Kirsanova, 2017) .
In other words, the existence of multiple equilibria implies that consequent policymakers may fail to coordinate on the best equilibrium or, equivalently, fall into an expectation trap.
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This paper compares and contrasts in ‡ation targeting with soft exchange rate targeting under discretionary policy. Multiplicity arises in both cases. Under conventional in ‡ation targeting the model has three stable discretionary equilibria. If the economy is hit by a cost-push shock, in two of the three equilibria the monetary policy maker raises the interest rate and reduces demand. Although the terms of trade improve, their positive e¤ect on marginal costs is dominated by the e¤ect of lower demand. The private sector reduces its holdings of net foreign assets creating a persistent de…cit. The de…cit and all macroeconomic variables converge back to the steady state at a very slow rate. In contrast, in the second equilibrium the cost push shock is initially accommodated, and the large depreciation of the terms of trade causes the net foreign assets to accumulate.
Once the level of assets is high, the interest rate is raised and in ‡ation is brought back to its base. This delayed increase in the interest rate also brings net foreign assets -and all macroeconomic variables -back to the base line very quickly. In the presence of multiple equilibria, a coordination failure occurs: the agents can choose any of them and a sunspot decides which one will realise.
A similar coordination failure may also happen under soft exchange rate targeting, either partial or strict. The policy maker introduces an additional positive weight -in otherwise standard policy objective -that punishes the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. There is still a conventional discretionary equilibrium in which the exchange rate remains on target. However, as it is acceptable -but costly -that the future exchange rate can deviate from the target, the economic agents may coordinate on the second admissible equilibrium, in which the exchange rate is volatile around the target.
Our model abstracts from many features that may characterize developing countries, e.g. capital controls or incomplete exchange rate pass-through. However, we show that the assumption of incomplete …nancial markets in combination with discretionary monetary policy is su¢cient to generate 'expectation traps', i.e. multiple policy equilibria which are associated with di¤erent volatilities of all macroeconomic variables. Our results are not restricted to this simple model, but will also prevail in more detailed settings. Both assumptions -incomplete …nancial markets and discretionary monetary policy -are justi…able for developing countries: Such countries have restricted access to international …nancial markets and the ability of policymakers to precommit to future policies is generally weaker than in developed countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section presents the model. Section 3.1 discusses the policy equilibria for an in ‡ation targeting regime and Section 3.2 discusses them under nominal exchange rate targeting. Section 4 concludes. The size of the Home economy is in…nitely small relative to the size of the Foreign econ-omy, therefore the economic performance and policy decisions do not have any impact on the rest of the world. Each economy is populated by in…nity-living households and …rms.
Model Highlights
Households' consume two goods, home-and foreign-produced, and their preferences re ‡ect home bias in consumption. The law of one price holds. Firms are monopolistically competitive, and only use labor to produce di¤erentiated tradable goods. Production takes place in two stages. First, there is a continuum of intermediate goods …rms, which produce a di¤erentiated input. In the second stage …nal goods producers combine these inputs into output and sell them to households in both countries. Monopolistic competition and sticky prices give a meaningful role for monetary policy. Each country has an independent …scal authority, which …nances spending by distortionary taxes and bonds. Home bonds are not tradable and in zero net supply, while foreign bonds are internationally tradable. Financial markets are incomplete, and the portfolio allocation is determined by transaction costs.
All pro…ts received by home country …rms and …nancial intermediaries are rebated to home households. The Home country is subject to cost-push shocks. Full details of underlying microfoundations of the model are given in Appendix A. In the following we present only the linearized equations. 
Private Sector Equilibrium
The household optimization problem for the small open economy H yields a consumption Euler equation
whereĉ t denotes consumption,Ŝ t is the terms of trade (relative price of foreign producer price in terms of home producer price),^ Ht is Home producer price in ‡ation and{ t is the 6 We linearize the model around the unique zero-in ‡ation e¢cient steady state, see Appendix A.
short term nominal interest rate.
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Parameter is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and is the degree of trade openness:
The …rms' optimization problem gives the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve for the producer price in ‡ation
whereŷ t is output,ĝ t is government spending, …nanced by distortionary taxes, and^ t is an AR(1) Home cost-push shock. Parameter & is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and = 1 is a monopolistic markup which is related to the elasticity of substitution between home goods : Parameter denotes the household discount factor and the slope of the Phillips curve = (1 ) (1 ) = is a function of the Calvo (1983) probability of price change . Finally, parameter l is the steady state value of the labour income tax. The Home country maintains a balanced budget, so the e¤ect of marginal cost on in ‡ation is scaled by the factor 1= 1 + l .
The aggregate resource constraint can be written aŝ
whereĉ t is Foreign consumption. Parameter is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
For the other, large and e¤ectively closed economy, the corresponding equations arê
where b T t is normalized total real Foreign debt issued by the Foreign government and held by Home and Foreign residents, parameter % =
Finally, the model is closed with the risk premium equation
the current account equation
and the de…nition of nominal exchange rateÊ t
where is a Home portfolio adjustment cost parameter, = b F y is a measure of Foreign debt held by non-residents in the steady state.
The system of ten equations (1)- (10) describes the private sector equilibrium and determinesĉ t ;ŷ t ;^ Ht ; b t ; b T t ;ĉ t ;ŷ t ;^ F t ;Ê t andŜ t ; given the policy variables{ t ;{ t ;ĝ t ;ĝ t ;^ l t :
Small Open Economy Model in LQ Policy Framework
In the following we will only consider the dynamics of the small open economy and treat all variables of the large closed economy as exogenous shocks. Hence, we only work with the system of equations (1)- (3) and (8)- (10). Endogenous variables areĉ t ;ŷ t ;^ Ht ; b t ;Ê t andŜ t , the policy instrument is{ t . The cost push shock^ t as well as government spending ĝ t is treated as exogenous. System (4)-(7) determines other exogenous processesĉ t ;ŷ t ; (8)- (10) can be represented in the following form, suitable for standard policy analysis in the linear-quadratic (LQ) framework. For convenience we introduce a new variable
which measures the excess consumption under incomplete …nancial markets, as u t 0 under international risk sharing. Substituting out consumption and the interest rate (using equation (8)), the consumption Euler equation can be re-written as
The Phillips curve becomeŝ
and the current account equation is given by
In the following we will treat the terms of tradeŜ t as policy instrument, as it only enters contemporaneously in equations (12)- (14). 8 The three endogenous variables in system (12)- (14) are the foreign debt b t ; producer-price in ‡ation^ Ht and excess consumption u t . Once this system is solved, the interest rate needed to deliver the optimal policy can be found from (8), consumption can be recovered from equation (11) and output can be found from the aggregate demand equation (3).
Monetary Policy Regimes 2.3.1 In ‡ation Targeting
In this paper we assume that the following quadratic policy objective is delegated to the central bank by either society or legislation (see e.g. Kam et al. (2009) ):
where m is monetary policymaker's discount factor. The above policy objective has been shown by Woodford (2003) to approximate the aggregate of individual utility functions in a closed economy model with complete …nancial markets. In our model, this approximation will not hold up to the second order, but is frequently considered in the literature as a likely objective given to the central bank. Where relevant, this policy objective also plays the role of 'social loss', so all welfare losses are computed using metric (15). 
Nominal Exchange Rate Targeting
Under nominal exchange rate targeting the central bank uses the following objective
where we impose an additional weight ! e on the stabilisation of the nominal exchange rate around its steady state value.
If ! e = 0 then the objective (16) reduces to the standard in ‡ation targeting regime (15). If ! e = 1 then the objective (16) is equivalent to a strict exchange rate targeting regime:
This targeting regime has some similarities with a …xed exchange rate regime. In particular, this regime assumes that the policy maker announces the target, perhaps within a corridor (which we do not model as binding in any way, so it does not a¤ect expectations of the private sector) and implements policy to keep the exchange rate on target. The exchange rate, however, is allowed to deviate from the target, although such deviations are costly. 
Policy, Policy Instrument and Solution
The central bank manipulates the short term interest rate to a¤ect the terms of tradeŜ to minimise loss (15) (or (16)) subject to system(12)-(14). A discretionary solution can be written in the form of linear feedback rules
where vector y t denotes the vector of endogenous predetermined states, and vector x t denotes the vector of exogenous predetermined states. In case of in ‡ation targeting vector 10 The peg is 'soft' as it is a result of optimisation policy and so is di¤erent from a 'hard' peg where the monetary policy maker is prepared to sell any quantity of reserves at a given price to keep the exchange rate exactly on target. A hard peg cannot be modeled within our framework of optimisation with a quadratic loss function because any regime with quadratic loss function allows (costly) deviations from the parity. A representation in the form of (18)- (21)is conveniant to illustrate the multiplicity of discretionary equilibria.
Calibration
The share of government spending to GDP, g=y and g =y ; is set to 0.20 for each country.
We set ! = The calibration of structural parameters is standard. The model frequency is quarterly.
The household's discount factor is set to 0.99 which gives the steady state interest rate of 4% and the Calvo parameter is set to 0.75 which implies the average length of …xed price contracts of about one year. Openness is set to = 0:3. The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity is calibrated = 0:5; based on evidence in Attanasio and Weber (1995) . The elasticity between home goods = 11 and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply = 3 are calibrated consistently with most estimations of DSGE models (Liu and Mumtaz (2011), Justiniano and Preston (2010), Chen et al. (2013) ). The intertemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is set to 1.5, see Albonico 11 Coe¢cients b; u; ; s can be found by solving the …rst order conditions. Our de…nition of discretion is conventional, see e.g Clarida et al. (1999) . We present the general discretionary problem in LQ models in Appendix E. et al. (2016) and Adolfson et al. (2008) . Finally, following Galí and Monacelli (2005) cost push shocks in the domestic country and the rest of the world follow AR(1) processes with persistence parameter = 0:4. The standard deviation of a cost push shock is 0:005. We only consider one shock in our welfare computations, as this does not a¤ect any of our results. Adding more shocks simply rescales the loss numbers in a not-informative way.
Discretionary Policy and Expectations Traps
In this section we demonstrate that expectation traps are relevant for a monetary policymaker in a small open economy. We …rst consider standard in ‡ation targeting policy. To stabilise in ‡ation, the policymaker must choose a plan how quickly to bring the marginal costs back to their steady state level. The policymaker may be expected to stabilise marginal costs slower or faster, and multiple equilibria arise. Similarly, under soft exchange rate targeting, di¤erent speeds of stabilization of the nominal exchange rate is possible. Table 1 reports that the model exhibits three discretionary equilibria under in ‡ation targeting, which we label A, B, and C. Table 1 shows that equilibria A and B share certain characteristics while equilibrium C appears very di¤erent.
In ‡ation Targeting
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In particular, the feedback coe¢cients on in ‡ation, terms of trade and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium C are all much larger in magnitude than those for equilibria A and B, suggesting greater volatility in a stochastic economy.
In addition, while the nominal interest rate is lowered in response to higher foreign assets in equilibria A and B it is raised markedly in equilibrium C. These three equilibria produce qualitatively and quantitatively di¤erent economic dynamics, as shown in Figure 1 which plots the responses of key variables to a one-percent domestic mark up shock. To understand these results, and also to provide an intuition for the rise of mulitiplicity, we look closer at the transmission mechanism of shocks under optimal discretionary policy.
Monetary policy aims to stabilize in ‡ation and does it via in ‡uencing the path for marginal cost. The forward representation of the Phillips curve (13) can be written aŝ
where the real marginal costs can be expressed as
It is apparent that movements in mc t and mc t+1 are highly substitutable in terms of their e¤ect on Ht and that there are multiple paths for mc t that will return in ‡ation to target.
These di¤erent paths for real marginal costs are associated with di¤erent monetary policies 13 Parameters w 1 > 0; w 2 > 0; w 3 and the composite shock " d;t are given in Appendix C.
and with di¤erent performances in terms of the loss. Equation (23) shows that monetary policy can a¤ect mc t through two distinct channels. The standard response to lower marginal cost is to tighten monetary policy. In our case this means an improvement in the terms of trade, as w 1 > 0 in equation (23). Households will respond by reducing consumption and selling foreign assets as the terms of trade drive the evolution of net foreign assets in equation (14). Alternatively, the policy maker can conduct expansionary monetary policy which implies a depreciation of the terms of trade, but also causes net foreign assets to accumulate.
The key for multiplicity is that the impact ofŜ t and b t onmc t is in opposite directions.
Notice that a reduction inŜ t causes a fall in b t and thatŜ t and b t have countervailing e¤ects onmc t . As a consequence, the desirability of each policy from the perspective of the period-t policymaker turns on how future policymakers are expected to respond to movements in the stock of net foreign assets.
Consider the case where future policymakers are expected to lower the interest rate and depreciate the terms of trade in response to a rise in the stock of net foreign assets.
Following a positive cost push shock^ t , the current policy of raising the real interest rate and causingŜ t and b t to decline will successfully deliver lower real marginal costs and in ‡ation because the boost in future real marginal costs caused by the decline in the stock of net foreign assets is o¤set by lower terms of trade in the future. Under this approach, monetary policy responds to the positive markup shock by contracting demand, lowering real marginal costs and in ‡ation, and next by lowering interest rates and increasing the terms of trade as in ‡ation declines allowing the economy to recover, producing an equilibrium. Alternatively, if future policymakers are expected to raise the interest rate and reduce the terms of trade in response to a higher stock of net foreign assets, then a current policy that lowers the real interest rate and raises the terms of trade This is despite the boost toŜ t and mc t today, because future policymakers respond to the higher foreign assets by tightening monetary policy, producing another equilibrium.
This is exactly what Panel I of Figure 1 illustrates. As anticipated, we …nd that the behaviour of the economy is notably di¤erent in equilibria A (and B) and C. In equilibrium C monetary policy accommodates cost-push shocks, but allows to bring the stock of assets private-sector learnable, but only equilibria A and C are jointly learnable, as discussed in Dennis and Kirsanova (2017) . This implies that conventional methods of …nding discretionary solution by backwards induction (Oudiz and Sachs, 1985) can only …nd equilibria A and C. However, there is a discontinuity at = 0; where the problem is isomorphic to the one under international risk sharing, with private sector investing into state-contingent assets and one-period foreign bonds is one of them. A unique discretionary equilibrium with properties similar to those in equilibrium C can be obtained analytically (see Appendix D). Equilibria A and B correspond to a single solution with zero feedback of all control variables on net foreign assets, producing explosive dynamics of the economy, and are ruled out as discretionary equilibria by transversality conditions.
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Can the multiplicity be eliminated by delegating a particular policy objective to the policymaker? The answer is positive, and many such delegation schemes may exist. However, they do not necessarily result in higher overall welfare. For example, the intrinsic property of equilibrium C is that it implies a relatively fast adjustment of the endogenous predetermined state, foreign assets. Making the fast adjustment costly may help to eliminate this equilibrium. Panel III in Figure 1 illustrates a policy delegation where the policymaker minimises the loss with an additional penalty on changes in net foreign asset position = 1e-8: 15 In this model we consider government debt. The results are una¤ected by the debt ownership structure. Assuming that the foreign debt is privately-issued and its net supply is zero, would only a¤ect exogenous processes. (24), the loss in the best equilibrium is una¤ected if the monetary policymaker is impatient, m < ; see Table 2 which reports the losses in equilibria A and C for di¤erent discount factors m :
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Once the policymaker discounts the future at a su¢ciently high rate ( m 0:08 for the base line calibration), only the best equilibrium A survives.
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Equilibrium C relies on the ability of the policymaker to delay stabilisation of in ‡ation until future periods, which is ruled out by impatience. Table 2 demonstrates, however, that the loss in the worst equilibrium C increases with the degree of impatience, and an inability to choose the right discounting may result in a substantially worse outcome.
Exchange Rate Targeting
Unlike in ‡ation targeting, discretionary policy can be consistent with keeping the nominal exchange rate on target at all times.
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If the policy maker targets the nominal exchange rate, complete stabilization can be achieved. However, this equilibrium is not unique and the policymaker may not be able to achieve complete stabilisation of the nominal exchange rate.
The intuition for this result is similar to the one presented above. Exchange rate targeting requires to stabilise prices of foreign goods. We can rewritê E t = P F;t P t =Ŝ t + P H;t P t =Ŝ t + H;t + P H;t 1 P t
which is similar to representation (22). Therefore, there is no surprise that we have several paths for marginal costs each of which eventually stabilises the nominal exchange rate. Figure 2 demonstrates the responses to a domestic cost push shock in two discretionary equilibria labelled A and C. Figure 1 , and this results in relatively large welfare losses, see Table 3 .
In equilibrium C the policymaker lowers the interest rate sharply. The nominal exchange rate depreciates and is not kept on target. Nevertheless, this is a discretionary equilibrium consistent with the stabilization of the nominal exchange rate, as the policymaker is still able to keep the nominal exchange rate stable 'on average' in response to a positive cost push shock. As soon as the private sector expects that future policymakers The stabilisation is costly, as the volatility of all variables is substantial. However, this strategy is consistent with the soft exchange rate target as it ensures the convergence back towards the target in the medium term, see Figure 2 . In other words, as it is less costly to validate the expectations of the private sector than to accommodate them, the policymaker is trapped in this equilibrium. Similar to the in ‡ation targeting regime the targeted variable is allowed to deviate from the target, and the current policymaker perceives that the private sector expects future policymakers to appreciate the nominal exchange rate, it will optimally choose to generate a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate today. Multiplicity is also preserved in the more general form of exchange rate targeting using the hybrid objective (16). Table 4 Multiplicity, however, is eliminated if the policymaker is impatient. Equilibrium C arises as there is a possibility to stabilise the exchange rate tomorrow. Table 5 reports our results of reducing the policymaker's discount factor, m in the objective (17). Once it is su¢ciently small ( m . 0:03) the stable inferior equilibrium disappears.
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The best 20 This result was obtained numerically. Appendix F demonstrates that for m = 0 the nominal exchange Despite it is commonly suggested that currency pegging is an e¢cient way to import low and stable in ‡ation, it is apparent that in the case of a 'soft peg' the implied volatility of the nominal exchange rate and domestic in ‡ation in the worst regime is higher than it is in the case of in ‡ation targeting. This is not surprising: these are two 'second-best' scenarios, and there cannot be any a priori ranking between them.
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how multiple equilibria can occur in a small open economy model with incomplete …nancial markets under discretionary monetary policy. As current policymakers cannot control the behaviour of future policymakers nor the expectation of the private sector coordination failures and expectation traps can occur. In our model policy makers need to decide if the economy should be stabilized today or at some point in the future.
We believe that the presented model is capable of explaining recent empirical evidence on exchange rate behaviour: there can be switches between policy regimes that are characterized by changes in the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. This can happen for a wide and realistic class of policy objectives, as long as the policy maker acts under discretion and there is at least one predetermined state variable in the system. rate is always kept on target.
Although the presented model is highly stylised, and bringing it to the data is therefore beyond the scope of this paper, a su¢ciently complex model with these features will retain multiplicity of equilibria and should be able to replicate the observed volatilities of key macroeconomic variables, in particular the nominal exchange rate.
